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Affective significance: affectively significant items are those that have either
negative or positive value to the organism.
Dprime: perceptual sensitivity measure that takes into account both ‘hits’ (e.g.
correct, target-present trials) and ‘false alarms’ (incorrect, target-absent trials).
Dprime scores effectively discount for elevated numbers of false alarms and
are independent of response criterion.
Emotion: emotion and motivation (see later) are closely linked concepts as
both depend on the relationship between the organism and its environment
(e.g. positive–negative, approach–withdrawal).
Executive control: set of functions, typically believed to depend on the frontal
cortex (and probably the parietal cortex), which are needed when non-routine
behaviors are called for – namely, when ‘control’ is required. These functions
are thought to confer behavioral flexibility and context-dependency to complex
behaviors.
Motivation: commonly defined as what makes one work to obtain a reward or
to avoid punishment. In the case of emotion (see earlier), the emphasis might
be on the evaluative aspect of the organism–environment relationship,
whereas in the case of motivation it might be on how the organism acts in a
given situation.
Resources: specific information processing mechanisms (e.g. inhibition) have
their own limited processing capacities or resources. Given the limited capacity
of mental resources, performance is impaired if demands are greater thanEmotion and motivation have crucial roles in determin-
ing human behavior. Yet, how they interact with cogni-
tive control functions is less understood. Here, the basic
elements of a conceptual framework for understanding
how they interact are introduced. More broadly, the
‘dual competition’ framework proposes that emotion
and motivation affect both perceptual and executive
competition. In particular, the anterior cingulate cortex
is hypothesized to be engaged in attentional/effortful
control mechanisms and to interact with several other
brain structures, including the amygdala and nucleus
accumbens, in integrating affectively significant signals
with control signals in prefrontal cortex. An implication
of the proposal is that emotion and motivation can either
enhance or impair behavioral performance depending on
how they interact with control functions.
Perceptual and executive competition
Although the impact of affective significance (see Glossary)
on behavioral performance is well documented [1], in gen-
eral, the mechanisms by which this impact is manifested
remain poorly understood. And, whereas some progress
has been made concerning the interactions between
emotion and specific cognitive processes [2,3], important
gaps still remain. Crucially, relatively little is known about
the role of affective significance in ‘executive control’ func-
tions. Here, our goal is to propose a conceptual framework
that describes how affective significance impacts the flow of
information processing in the brain, with a particular aim
at understating how it can either enhance or impair beha-
vioral performance according to the situation at hand.
Items laden with affective significance include those that
involve threat (e.g. via pairingwithmild shock) and reward
(e.g. via pairing with cash). The framework thus attempts
to describe how both emotion and motivation interact with
executive control to determine behavioral outcome – in
contrast with proposals that focus on either threat or
reward processing. Here, it is suggested that both emotion
and motivation signals are integrated with executive func-
tions so as to effectively incorporate value into the unfold-
ing of behavior. The proposed framework is referred to as
the ‘dual competition’ model to reflect the suggestion that
affective significance influences competition at both the
perceptual and executive levels – and because the impact is
caused by both emotion and motivation.
According to many proposals of attention, objects com-
pete for limited perceptual processing capacity and controlCorresponding author: Pessoa, L. (lpessoa@indiana.edu).
160 1364-6613  2009 Elsevier Ltd. All rights resof behavior [4,5]. To understand the flow of information
processing more widely, in addition to the role of percep-
tual competition, it is crucial to understand the impact of
executive control functions on item processing. Executive
control involves a host of ‘adjustment processes’, including
perceptual selection, detection and resolution of conflict,
and maintenance of contextual information. Executive
control is not unitary, and different mechanisms can have
their own limited processing capacities or resources [6,7].
Neuropsychological research also supports the dissociation
of executive functions, consistent with the fractionation of
the central executive [8–10]. The exact fractionation of
executive functions is subject to debate, but probably
involves at least three functions [11,12]: inhibition, shifting
and updating. Crucially, ample evidence indicates some
unity of executive functions as well, consistent with the
notion that mechanisms are shared across functions
[12,13]. This ‘capacity sharing’ has important implications
for the understanding of human information processing –
because it leads to ‘executive competition’. Here, it is
proposed that subcomponents of executive control are
mutually interacting, such that resources devoted to one
component will detract from those available to other com-
ponents. For instance, if resources required to carry out
behavioral inhibition are partly shared with those needed
during shifting, an individual needing towithhold respond-
ing in a trial might exhibit an increased switching cost ifavailable capacity. In addition to having their own specific resources, executive
functions are proposed to share a common resource pool.
erved. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.006 Available online 13 March 2009
Figure 1. Dual competition model framework. Affective significance impacts the flow of information processing both in a (a) ‘stimulus-driven’ (note fearful face paired with
shock as input) and a (b) ‘state-dependent’ fashion based on motivational manipulations (note neutral face input). In both cases competition is suggested to occur at the
perceptual and executive levels. Arrows denote functional pathways that do not necessarily map one-to-one to specific anatomical connections. Individual differences in
state and/or trait anxiety and sensitivity to reward are expected to modulate the impact of affective significance on information processing.
Opinion Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.13 No.4she is asked in close temporal succession to switch between
tasks (e.g. Ref. [14]).
It is hypothesized that affective significance determines
the flow of information processing in at least two general
ways: in a ‘stimulus-driven’ and a ‘state-dependent’ man-
ner.
Stimulus-driven effects
Emotion-laden stimuli include those involving emotional
expressions or affective scenes, in addition to originally
neutral items that might have acquired affective signifi-
cance by previous pairing with aversive events (e.g. pairing
with mild shock). It is hypothesized that affective signifi-
cance impacts both perceptual competition and executive
control (Figure 1a). Perceptual competition, which takes
place in visual cortex, is affected because emotional content
enhances sensory representations of emotional items
(Figure 1a, arrow 1), which is well documented in human
visual cortex [1]. Such enhancement depends, at least in
part, on output connections from the amygdala, which is
known to project to multiple levels of visual cortex, in-
cluding the primary visual cortex [15].
Executive control is affected by emotional content
because; firstly, strengthened sensory representations will
receive prioritized attention (Figure 1a, arrow 2). For
example, items with increased visual responses can direct
spatial attention towards those locations – this will occur
as long as sufficient processing resources are available [16].
Secondly, executive control is modulated because affective
information might be directly conveyed to control struc-
tures (Figure 1a, arrow 3). For instance, amygdala outputs
might convey the significance of an item via connections
with anterior cingulate cortex (ACC) territories, which
might help direct attention towards the location of the
emotional item via connections with the dorsolateral pre-frontal cortex (PFC) (see later). In this manner, the modu-
lation of executive control eventually affects visual
processing [17] (Figure 1a, arrow 4).
The impact of an emotion-laden stimulus on behavior
crucially depends on how it affects the flow of executive
functions. It is hypothesized that this will depend on the
level of threat, which, accordingly, will determine if
emotional content enhances or impairs behavioral per-
formance. When emotional content is low in threat, proces-
sing is biased in favor of the emotional item (Figure 2a) –
this situation also extends to positive stimuli [18] (Box 1).
In particular, the spatial locus of the emotional item is
privileged, possibly because items that are low in threat
are somewhat ambiguous and so might attract further
attention as part of additional information gathering
[19]. In this manner, emotional content enhances target
processing with relatively minor effects on irrelevant
stimuli and other executive functions thatmight be needed
(e.g. if task switching is involved). Thus, in the low-threat
case, although emotional items are prioritized, the impact
on behavior is modest – in this sense, it can be said that a
‘soft’ prioritization occurs. Because the effect on perform-
ance is relatively weak, behavioral findings can be difficult
to replicate and might be observed only in high-anxious
individuals (e.g. Ref. [20]). Furthermore, whereas low-
threat emotional stimuli comprise a privileged stimulus
category, their processing is highly dynamic and depends
on the interplay of a host of factors that sculpt the associ-
ated neural responses, including attention, task context,
awareness and perceptual interpretation [21].
When emotional content is high in threat, resources are
diverted towards the processing of the item. The mobiliz-
ation of the resources is more extreme, and the effects on
behavior considerably more dramatic [22,23]. In this case,
themain impact on behavior comes from the recruitment of161
Figure 2. Executive control and competition are viewed as involving multiple mechanisms, or resources. Larger unfilled ellipses represent executive control; smaller shapes
represent processing resources. (a) When threat level is low, affective significance enhances the processing of the item. Other executive functions are not strongly impacted
(smaller ellipses). (b–d) Processes are hypothesized to share resources, here called common-pool resources (smaller ellipses in bright blue), such that the engagement of
one will detract from the processing of the other. Common-pool resources are proposed to be necessary for general functions of attentional/effortful control. (b) High-threat
emotion-laden stimuli will typically recruit common-pool resources that allow their processing to be prioritized, which will detract from other mechanisms sharing those
resources (see intersections indicated in bright blue). (c) High threat will also trigger specific executive functions to handle the challenges to the organism, as indicated by
the arrows emanating from attentional/effortful control. For instance, ‘updating’ might be needed to refresh the contents of working memory, ‘shifting’ might be recruited to
switch the current task set and ‘inhibition’ could be called for to cancel previously planned actions. (d) State-dependent affective significance, such as reward, is
hypothesized to have two main effects on executive function. Firstly, motivation fine-tunes executive functions that are important for the task at hand (represented by the
change of shape of the updating function; see green arrow). Secondly, motivation can rearrange the allocation of common-pool resources (bright blue ellipse; see orange
arrow), thereby affecting other executive resources.
Opinion Trends in Cognitive Sciences Vol.13 No.4attentional/effortful control that is required to prioritize
the processing of high-threat information (Figure 2b) –
thus, ‘hard’ prioritization occurs. In particular, atten-
tional/effortful control is envisaged as involving processing
resources that are strongly shared by several executiveBox 1. Positive and other stimuli
In the main text, the effects of emotional content on information
processing are discussed in terms of threat level because they
provide the clearest example of cognitive-emotional interactions in
which both perceptual and executive competition are needed to
explain how affectively potent information impacts behavior (e.g.
see Figure 3c,d in main text). However, the framework should be
generalized to consider other stimulus classes, including high-
intensity perceptual stimuli (including items high in arousal but of
neutral valence [60]), novel and erotic stimuli. In these cases,
stimulus-driven effects might function as in the low threat situation,
although stronger effects might be generated by items of suffi-
ciently high arousal (e.g. Ref. [61]). In other words, high-arousal
items can command a form of ‘hard prioritization’ (see main text)
such that processing resources needed by executive functions are
devoted to their processing, thereby impairing task performance in
a manner analogous to that shown in Figure 2b (in the main text). In
particular, exposure to erotica enhances visual responses [62] and
can interfere with ongoing tasks [63,64]. Interestingly, during the
viewing of these items, both the amygdala and the ventral striatum
are strongly recruited, in addition to the ACC [65]. Because these
regions are key nodes of the scheme proposed in Figure 4 (in the
main text), the interaction between the processing of erotic stimuli
and cognitive function might function in a manner closely related to
that proposed here for threat-related information.
162functions (see also Refs. [24–26]). Because high-threat is
expected to recruit such ‘common-pool resources’, it will
impair other executive functions that are reliant on them,
including inhibition, shifting and updating. For instance,
in a recent study, performance during response inhibition
was compromised when participants viewed high- versus
low-arousing pictures [27]. Specifically, emotional scenes
preceding both go and stop stimuli increased the stop-
signal reaction time, a measure of the temporal evolution
of inhibitory processes (see also Ref. [28]). The processing of
threat typically will require further actions and, in
addition to the consumption of common resources, could
involve the triggering of multiple mechanisms that are
specific to the task at hand (Figure 2c).
Although the notion of resources has at times been
viewed as vague [29] (but see Ref. [30]), one approach to
understanding resource consumption could be to probe the
correspondence of brain sites that are sensitive to specific
experimental conditions. It is particularly instructive, for
instance, to observe the overlap between attentional
manipulations and those that are sensitive to higher levels
of threat. The ‘attentional network’ has been extensively
researched and is believed to involve fronto-parietal
regions, including the middle frontal gyrus (MFG), ACC,
inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and anterior insula [31,32]. To
assess brain regions that are sensitive to high levels of
threat, the activation sites of the contrast of CS+ (i.e.
stimuli paired with an unconditioned stimulus) versus
Figure 3. Processing resources and threat. Summary of results from 34 positron
emission tomography (PET) and fMRI studies of conditioning from 1995 to 2008,
illustrating the coordinates provided for the contrast of threat (CS+) versus safe
(CS-). (a) Activation peaks that were observed in the ACC, or nearby cortex, are
shown in green for right hemisphere results and red for left hemisphere results (all
coordinates were projected onto a midline view for display purposes). (b) Results
for the right lateral surface are shown on an inflated surface to reveal multiple PFC
sites, including ones that are not on the surface. These included the middle frontal
gyrus, inferior frontal gyrus and anterior insula (note that the surface inflation
‘pushed up’ some of the activation sites relative to their standard anatomical
positions). (c) Subjects viewed an array of letters superimposed on task-irrelevant
faces and were asked to report whether or not the target letter X was present [33].
During the low attentional load condition shown here, the target appeared among
a uniform array of distractors (’pop-out’ condition). During the high attentional
load condition (not shown), a non-uniform array of letters was employed (search
condition). During the threat condition, faces were previously paired with mild
electrical shock, whereas safe stimuli were never paired with shock. (d) Differential
responses to task-irrelevant threat and safe faces were inversely correlated with
behavioral performance, suggesting that the processing of threat captured
processing resources needed for task execution as a function of threat-related
responses. Results are shown for a region of interest in the ACC that was defined in
terms of a separate contrast of high versus low attentional load (shown in the
inset). Data reanalyzed from Ref. [33].
Figure 4. Effects of threat and motivation on executive function. Key brain regions
mediating the interactions between emotion and/or motivation with executive
control function. Both types of interaction are hypothesized to depend on the
anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Abbreviations: DLPFC, dorsolateral PFC; IFG,
inferior frontal gyrus; LC, locus coeruleus; Nacc, nucleus accumbens; OFC,
orbitofrontal cortex; VTA, ventral tegmental area.
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stimulus) of 34 aversive conditioning studies were
reviewed here. In addition to the amygdala, several frontal
activation sites were consistently reported, including
MFG, ACC, IFG and anterior insula (Figure 3a,b). Thus,
it seems that high-threat processing engages key nodes of
the attentional network, consistent with the notion that it
is linked to resource consumption.
It is possible to further operationalize resource con-
sumption by linking observed evoked functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) responses and behavioral per-
formance. For instance, in a recent experiment [33], sub-
jects performed a search task under low and high
attentional demands (Figure 3c), which were contrasted
to determine brain sites sensitive to the availability of
processing resources. Differential responses (high versus
low) were observed in several fronto-parietal regions com-
monly associated with the attentional network, including
the ones previously listed. In the same study, subjects were
also shown task-irrelevant threat and safe faces
(Figure 3c). Interestingly, increased responses to threatversus safe faces were observed in several of the same
fronto-parietal regions. To further test the idea that
additional processing resources were recruited during
the viewing of threatening stimuli (relative to safe), in a
new analysis, we correlated evoked fMRI responses in the
regions modulated by attentional load with behavioral
accuracy during the task. As illustrated in Figure 3d,
the higher the ACC recruitment during the threat con-
dition, the worse the behavioral performance (relative to
the safe condition; p < 0.05). Interestingly, a similar pat-
tern of results was observed in multiple regions, including
MFG, IFG and anterior insula, in addition to superior
parietal lobule (although the exact spatial overlap between
attentional load and threat effects varied slightly for these
regions). Consistent with the increased processing of
shock-paired stimuli, such stimuli exhibited increased
behavioral priming and fMRI repetition effects relative
to unpaired faces during a subsequent implicit-memory
task [33]. These findings indicate that consumption of
processing resources engaged by task-irrelevant threat
faces (as indicated via, e.g. ACC responses) impaired per-
formance on the main task.
Overall, interactions between high threat processing
and executive functions are proposed to take place via at
least three types of neural mechanisms (Figure 4). Firstly,
it is hypothesized that threat processing engages atten-
tional/effortful control mechanisms in the ACC and, in
particular, the dorsal site observed in the previous analysis
(see inset in Figure 3d) – in contrast to more rostral sites
[34]. The ACC is important for integrating inputs from
multiple sources, including affective and motivational
inputs [35,36] – and in this respect works in close coopera-
tion with the anterior insula and OFC [37]. The ACC has
also been suggested to be involved in conflict detection,
error likelihood processing and errormonitoring, and helps
determine the benefits and costs of acting. It is suggested
here that ACC engagement during threat will impair
executive function because common-pool resources that
are required to prioritize threat processing are taken up.
Secondly, threat also recruits multiple PFC sites that are
involved in specific executive functions (Figure 4, green
arrows). This recruitment is suggested to depend, at least
in part, on the ACC, whose signals are known to influence163
* J. B. Engelmann et al. (2009). Combined effects of attention and motivation on
visual task performance: transient and sustained motivational effects. Frontiers in
Human Neuroscience (submitted).
y S. Padmala and L. Pessoa. Motivation and inhibitory control: reward delays
response inhibition and decreases responses in inferior frontal cortex. Paper/poster
presentation at the 38th AnnualMeeting of the Society for Neuroscience, Washington,
D.C., 2008.
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motor and visceral responses [35]. For instance, the ACC
might engage the MFG, which is important in the manip-
ulation of information, among other important functions.
In this manner, additional specific processing resources
are diverted to the processing of threat information
(Figure 4, orange regions). Thirdly, threat affects executive
functions by inducing state changes that are implemented
via ascending systems [38,39] (Figure 4, red arrows).
The neural interactions described previously indicate
that the effects of affective significance on behavioral
performance will typically depend on multiple factors.
For example, emotional content will enhance stimulus-
driven processing in a way that could enhance or impair
task performance. An important dimension in determining
the impact of affective significance on information proces-
sing is task relevance. Specifically, an emotion-laden item
that is task relevant will often improve behavioral per-
formance because additional processing resources will
typically be devoted to it (relative to neutral). At the same
time, a task irrelevant emotional item will usually impair
performance because resources will be taken away from
the main task. As described, another important dimension
of emotional information corresponds to the level of threat.
On the one hand, emotional items that are relatively low in
threat will benefit from sensory enhancement, whichmight
improve, for instance, reaction time when the item is task
relevant. On the other hand, emotional items that are
relatively high in threat will lead to enhanced sensory
enhancement but, crucially, will also divert processing
resources away from other mechanisms. Thus, in many
tasks, items that are high in threat will impair behavioral
performance even though sensory processing is enhanced.
The impairment will be typically observedwhen the item is
task irrelevant, especially in high-anxious individuals [26].
State-dependent effects
State-dependent effects on executive control depend on
general factors such as mood and anxiety [40]. This section
focuses instead on a less explored source of state-depend-
ent effects on executive function involving reward-related
manipulations of motivation.
A wealth of non-human and human studies has
described brain regions that are involved in the repres-
entation of reward [41]. However, how motivation impacts
other brain regions that contribute to improving beha-
vioral performance has received less attention. In humans,
important steps in attempting to fill in this gap have been
taken in recent years. For instance, Locke and Braver [42]
showed that incentives modulated task performance,
potentially by altering the control strategy employed by
participants. Neuroimaging data indicated that the reward
condition was associated with a sustained increase in
parietal and PFC regions of the right hemisphere (see also
Refs [43–46]).
It is hypothesized that motivation, like threat, impacts
both perceptual competition and executive control
(Figure 1b). Furthermore, motivation has two main effects
on executive function. Firstly, reward will lead to the
sharpening of executive functions. Crucially, reward is
suggested to have specific influences on cognitive function164(Figure 2d, green arrow) – as opposed to general effects,
such as arousal. Recent behavioral results are consistent
with this notion. For instance, motivation affected both the
orienting and reorienting of attention, and the impact was
evident during both exogenous [47] and endogenous tasks
(J. B. Engelmann et al., unpublished*). Observed effects
were specific, such that detection sensitivity (i.e. dprime)
increased as a function of absolute incentive level. In
parallel with improvements in behavioral performance,
fMRI responses in visual cortex also increased as a function
of absolute incentive level. Therefore, the findings indicate
that elevated motivation leads to improved efficiency in
orienting and reorienting of attention and that one mech-
anism by which attention and motivation interact involves
the enhancement of attention during motivationally sali-
ent conditions – resulting in the boosting of responses in
occipitotemporal visual regions engaged by the task at
hand (Figure 1b, arrow 4) (see also Refs [45,46,48,49]).
Secondly, motivation is proposed to recalibrate the allo-
cation of processing resources available to executive func-
tions, to maximize potential reward. Because of capacity
sharing, such reallocation is suggested to impact not only
target functions directly associated with rewarded beha-
viors but also other processes that share some of the same
processing resources (Figure 2d, orange arrow). In this
manner, motivation could affect executive function in a
way that is actually deleterious to behavioral performance.
For instance, in a recent study, participants who were
rewarded for accurate and fast performance on go trials
of a stop-signal task exhibited impaired inhibitory per-
formance as evidenced by prolonged stop-signal reaction
time (S. Padmala and L. Pessoa, unpublishedy). One
possibility is that, to maximize reward, participants
enhanced attention to the go stimulus, leaving fewer
resources to process the stop stimulus (see Ref. [50]). In
this sense, incentives can be viewed as reallocating
resources to prioritize the processing of the rewarded
function in a way that is similar to that discussed for
threat processing.
As in the case of threat processing, it is hypothesized
that motivation influences executive function by engaging
the ACC, partly via influences from the ventral striatum
and OFC (Figure 4). As before, it is hypothesized that
motivation-related ACC recruitment has an important role
in controlling the operations of other brain regions, so as to
maximize utility (i.e. maximize reward or minimize pun-
ishment); see Figure 4, green arrows. For instance, the
dorsolateral PFC might be recruited to resolve conflict in a
way that increases utility. Motivation also affects execu-
tive functions by inducing state changes that are imple-
mented via ascending systems – again, in a way that is
parallel to threat (Figure 4, red arrows). For instance,
incentives affect responses in the locus coeruleus (LC),
which regulates norepinephrine function, and also modu-
late dopaminergic function. LC phasic firing often tracks
Box 2. Questions for future research
 Can the dual competition framework be extended to other sensory
modalities? The answer seems to be in the affirmative, at least for
auditory stimuli [66].
 Can positive stimuli ever lead to a ‘hard’ prioritization of
processing that is comparable to that of threat? In at least one
case, we failed to observe comparable effects [61].
 Is the impact of higher levels of threat the same across distinct
executive functions? For instance, does an affectively potent item
impair conflict processing and behavioral inhibition to a similar
extent?
 Can the model be extended to a broader range of motivational
states, including thirst, hunger and sexual drive?
 Should executive functions be viewed as tied to specific regions
or are they better conceptualized as engaging specific networks of
brain regions [67]?
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task-irrelevant items, such as distractors (see Ref. [51]).
These and other findings have led to the suggestion that
the LC is responsive to ongoing evaluations of task utility
provided by input from frontal structures [51].
The notion that motivation interacts with executive
functions to meet current behavioral demands and oppor-
tunities is well supported by animal studies of reward, too.
For instance, Redgrave and colleagues [52,53] have pro-
posed that the dopamine response, and consequently the
related striatal function, might be viewed as providing a
signal that facilitates the reallocation of limited behavioral
and cognitive processing capacity towards unexpected
events of behavioral significance, including rewarding
ones. These and other results (e.g. Refs [54,55]) are con-
sistent with the notion that striatal activation drives the
reallocation of available resources to process salient events
whose processing is then prioritized – instead of simply
providing a ‘reward signal’.
Above, interactions between emotion and motivation
with executive functions were discussed in terms of
stimulus-driven and state-dependent effects, respectively.
However, these two types of effects were not meant to
diagnostically capture the differences between emotion
and motivation. For instance, when one is hungry (i.e. in
a motivational state of hunger), food items are salient and
can direct attention in a stimulus-related fashion [46].
Conversely, anxiety might be thought of as an emotional
state of sustained threat, and leads to state-dependent
effects [56], too. Finally, in general, emotion and motiv-
ation are broad constructs and here, for brevity, we focus on
threat and reward processing only (Box 1).
Conclusions
The proposed framework of how emotion and motivation
interact with executive functions draws upon several ideas
in the literature, including biased competition [4] and
resource theory [6,7,30,57] – see also Braver et al. [58]
and Robbins et al. [59] for complementary proposals. A
considerable body of work has investigated how emotional
stimuli are prioritized in terms of attentional processes [1].
However, less research has been devoted to understanding
the integration of emotional information and executive
control. Likewise, a large amount of literature has con-
sidered the neural substrates of reward [41]. Again, lessresearch has attempted to investigate how motivation
directly interacts with executive function. The goal of the
dual competition framework is toproposebasic elementsofa
conceptual framework with which to understand how both
emotion and motivation are integrated with executive con-
trol. An important implication of the proposal is that
emotion andmotivation can either enhance or impair beha-
vioral performancedepending onhow they interactwith key
control functions.Carefully characterizinghowemotionand
motivation can be beneficial or deleterious to behavior (e.g.
as in drug addiction) constitutes a great challenge for future
research (Box 2).
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